CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION -Although a Municipal Ordinance Governing Airports May Regulate to Protect Citizens from Undue Annoyance from Religious Sects Canvassing for Converts, such Ordinances must be Narrow, Objective, and Definite. \u3cem\u3eInternational Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Rochford\u3c/em\u3e, 425 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ill. 1977) by Thornburg, Elizabeth G.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 43 | Issue 4 Article 10
1977
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION -Although a Municipal Ordinance
Governing Airports May Regulate to Protect
Citizens from Undue Annoyance from Religious
Sects Canvassing for Converts, such Ordinances
must be Narrow, Objective, and Definite.
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Rochford, 425 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ill. 1977)
Elizabeth G. Thornburg
Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law, ethornbu@smu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law
and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION -Although a Municipal Ordinance Governing
Airports May Regulate to Protect Citizens from Undue Annoyance from Religious Sects Canvassing for Converts, such Ordinances must be
Narrow, Objective, and Definite. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Rochford, 425 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ill. 1977), 43 J. Air
L. & Com. 875 (1977)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol43/iss4/10
Case Note
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION-Al-
though a Municipal Ordinance Governing Airports May Regulate
to Protect Citizens from Undue Annoyance from Religious Sects
Canvassing for Converts, such Ordinances must be Narrow, Objec-
tive, and Definite. International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Rochford, 425 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
The International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON)
is a non-profit religious corporation which promotes the views of
Krishna Consciousness. Its members are required to perform a re-
ligious ritual called Sankirtan which consists of evangelistic activi-
ties including solicitation of contributions and sale of religious
materials. For some time, members of ISKCON have performed
this ritual in the public areas of Chicago's O'Hare International
Airport, and they wish to continue to do so.
O'Hare Airport' is owned by the city of Chicago, subject to its
ordinances, and operated by the Chicago Department of Aviation.!
Effective March 29, 1976, the Commissioner of Aviation adopted
regulations' for all airports within his jurisdiction. The regulations
I O'Hare Airport, the busiest airport in the world, has 72 departure gates that
handle approximately 1,800 flights daily. The airport employs 33,000 persons;
some 100,000,000 passengers, visitors, and employees use the airport each year.
Portions of the airport are leased to airlines and concessionaires. These include
lobbies and areas open to the general public without restriction.
2 The Department of Aviation, an executive arm of the city government, was
established in 1958 by the Chicago Municipal Code. CHICAGO, ILL., CODE ch.
8.2 (1958).
'Pursuant to the authority vested in the Commissioner of the Department of
Aviation of the City of Chicago by Chapter 8.2 of the Municipal Code of the
City of Chicago, and in order to balance the rights of the traveling public and
those who have a right to be in public places to publicize their views, the follow-
ing regulations are adopted, to be effective immediately. These regulations are
intended to accomplish goals of:
-assuring fair use of facilities in Chicago's airports by passengers
and persons accompanying them, employees, lessees, and persons
and groups wishing to publicize their views;
-preventing interference with the right of passengers to free ac-
cess to the airport travel facilities and the free passage among those
facilities;
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were intended to balance the rights of the traveling public with
those who have a right to be in public places to express their views.'
-- discouraging interference with persons who are required to wait
in lines;
-preventing interference with hijack and other security measures;
-permitting equitable access among persons and groups desiring
to publicize their views.
I.
Persons authorized by law to distribute literature, or solicit contributions may
do so only in public areas of Chicago airports, provided that they may not do so
in the following areas:
A. All aircraft departure lounges and concourses leading to them including
concourses A through K;
B. All concourses leading to the terminal buildings including the rotunda;
C. At, in, at the entrance to, or exit from:
(1) hijack, search, and security areas;
(2) ticket counters;
(3) baggage pickup or collection areas;
(4) washroom areas;
(5) areas leased to concessionaires and other lessees except by permission
of such lessee;
(6) elevators, escalators, moving walkways; and
(7) main terminal doors and vestibules.
D. At locations where persons are in line at or before areas described in
subparagraph C.
II.
A. No person shall distribute literature or solicit contributions unless he shall
have registered beforehand with the airport manager or his authorized
representative for each day such activities are engaged in.
B. Between 9 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. each day each person who desires to dis-
tribute literature or solicit contributions shall register in person with the
airport manager or his authorized representative, who shall allot reserva-
tions for each day in the sequence each person registers. Each person
shall give his name and address as well as the organization or purpose he
represents and the terminal in which he will be on that day.
III.
A. No person except concessionaires and other lessees as permitted by con-
tract with the City of Chicago shall sell anything for commercial purposes.
B. No person shall make a noise or create other disturbances which inter-
feres with the ability of others to hear public announcements or interferes
with the transaction of business with airlines, concessionaires, or lessees.
IV.
The airport manager or his authorized representative may declare an emer-
gency on account of unusually congested conditions in the airport terminals caused
by weather, schedule interruptions, extremely heavy traffic movements or other
causes, or on account of emergency security measures. In such case an announce-
ment shall be made. All persons distributing literature or soliciting contributions
as permitted under paragraphs I and II shall immediately cease such activities for
the duration of such emergency.
International Soc'y for Krishna Cons., Inc. v. Rochford, 425 F. Supp. 734,
737-38 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (hereinafter cited as Airport Regulations).
4Id.
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Under the regulations, persons authorized by law may distribute
literature and solicit contributions only in the public areas of
Chicago airports, and many such areas are specifically excepted.5
Such persons must register with the airport manager each day be-
fore beginning their activities.' They may not sell anything for
"commercial purposes," nor may they "make a noise or create
other disturbances."" In addition, the airport manager may declare
an emergency should the terminals become "unusually congested"
and order all distribution of literature and solicitation of funds to
immediately cease for the duration of the emergency.8
ISKCON sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the en-
forcement of the regulations. The Society alleged that the ordinance
was unconstitutional under the first and fourteenth amendments as
it lacked procedures guaranteeing due process and gave airport
officials unqualified power to grant or deny permits. Contending
that there was no material issue of fact, ISKCON moved for sum-
mary judgment. Held, motion granted: Although a municipal ordi-
nance governing airports may regulate to protect citizens from un-
due annoyance from religious sects canvassing for converts, such
ordinances must be narrow, objective and definite."
This case becomes more enlightening when viewed as part of a
series of cases in which cities or airports sought to restrict various
forms of proselytizing. The simplest form of restriction used by the
cities was the application of general ordinances against peddling,
soliciting, public exhibitions, disorderly conduct, or breach of the
peace." Such regulations, however, were held to be inapplicable
to religious groups where they abridged freedom of religion, and




'The court further held that the regulations are facially unconstitutional in
that their provisions are susceptible to a number of meanings; they lack definite
standards to guide airport officials in making decisions which may abridge free-
dom of religion, speech and press. They also lack a procedure, administrative
or judicial, by which airport decisions can be reviewed.
"See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); International Soc'y for
Krishna Cons., Inc. v. New York Port Authority, 425 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); International Soc'y for Krishna Cons., Inc. v. Conlisk, 374 F. Supp. 1010
(N.D. 111. 1973).
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laws were deemed an unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom
of expression.11 Another approach adopted by some cities was the
use of written" and unwritten 3 regulations directly prohibiting the
distribution of literature. This practice was held to abridge freedom
of speech, press, and assembly.
Having realized that absolute prohibitions of first amendment
activities would be held unconstitutional, some cities sought to con-
dition the right to distribute handbills' or solicit funds' on the
prior permission of some municipal authority. Courts have held,
however, that preregistration may only stand when the statute is
narrow, objective, and definite."' Where these regulations gave un-
controlled discretion to a municipal official to grant or deny the
permits they have been found to be invalid.' Thus, even an ordi-
nance which allowed the distribution of literature and other demon-
strations as long as "the transportation function of the airport"
was not impaired was struck down, since it required any materials
used to be submitted to the airport managers before distribution."
In order to make the constitutional basis for these decisions
clearer, this note will examine the extent of first amendment guar-
antees and the government interest necessary to curb freedom of
expression. It will then explore possible avenues for putting limits
on solicitation in airports.
A. First Amendment Guarantees
The first amendment to the United States Constitution estab-
lishes' fundamental personal rights allowing each individual to
" See text accompanying notes 41-44 infra.
" See Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 423 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147 (1939); International Soc'y for Krishna Cons., Inc. v. Engelhardt, 425 F.
Supp. 176 (W.D. Mo. 1977); International Soc'y for Krishna Cons., Inc. v. City
of New Orleans, 347 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. La. 1972).
" See Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
14See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
" See International Soc'y for Krishna Cons. v. Dallas-Fort Worth Regional
Airport Bd., 391 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
" Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); International Soc'y for Krishna Cons., Inc.
v. Engelhardt, 425 F. Supp. 176 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
17Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
11 Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1973).
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express himself with immunity from legal censure."9 These rights,
however, are not absolute and exist only when the expression is
not harmful when tested by such standards as the law affords."
These rights are most often endangered when the ideas promoted
are supported by a minority of citizens. 1 Nevertheless, first amend-
ment rights of freedom of speech and religion are entitled to pro-
tection no matter how aberrant or abhorrent the expression may
seem to others.2
In the area of freedom of religion, the Court originally drew
a distinction between belief and conduct, granting greater consti-
tutional protection to the former." However, not all conduct resting
on religious belief is beyond the pale of first amendment protec-
tion. For example, the distribution of religious pamphlets is pro-
tected along with the right to hold the beliefs expressed in the
pamphlet itself.' Nor does the fact that pamphlets are sold com-
19 The first amendment provides that no law shall be made "respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances." This provi-
sion is made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. U.S.
CONST. amends. I, XIV.
20See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965): 'The rights of free
speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society, still do not
mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at
any public place and at any time." See also Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S.
584 (1942) (restrictions justified by needs of preservation of peace and good
order); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (restrictions justified
to promote general welfare, public health, safety, and morals); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (restrictions justified to safeguard use of public
highways); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (restrictions justified
to prevent 'clear and present danger').
21 "[I]f the majority member who would have the itinerant preacher swept off
the streets with the 6 P.M. trash were himself arrested on the streets for cheering
the Longhorn Band, or caroling with Dr. Criswell, then suddenly there would
materialize a renaissance of majority belief in First Amendment rights, illustrative
perhaps of an old Texas axiom: It depends on whose ox is in the ditch." Inter-
national Soc'y for Krishna Cons. v. Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport Bd.,
391 F. Supp. 610, 616 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (footnotes omitted).
I Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
23Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878).
"
4Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
' See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943).
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promise the right to distribute them."
First amendment rights, however, are not absolutes, and states
continually pass laws placing restrictions on the exercise of these
freedoms. Some survive constitutional attack, but many are struck
down by the courts. Laws seeking to limit first amendment guar-
antees have been invalidated on two principal grounds: the form
of the law, and the governmental interest it protects. Criticism of
laws based on form arises directly from the "preferred position"
of freedom of expression." Since this liberty is to be guarded with
particular scrutiny, any law which is overbroad, unduly vague, or
which constitutes a prior restraint on first amendment rights will be
held to be unconstitutional on its face."
Overbreadth scrutiny was a primary tool of the Warren Court."
Overbreadth analysis does not reach the question of whether the
challenger's speech is constitutionally protected, but rather strikes
statutes down because they might be applied to others not before
the court whose activities are protected."' Using overbreadth
scrutiny, the Court struck down a wide range of federal and state
statutes without considering the actual conduct of the litigants."
The Burger Court has been increasingly hostile to this method
of analysis."' In Broadrick v. Oklahoma" the Court held that a law
is fatally overbroad only if the harmfulness of the chilling effect it
produces is greater than, or at least substantial in relation to, the
legitimate interest which is the law's central thrust.'" This case
SId.
"7Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). This "preferred position" was criti-
cized by Justice Frankfurter in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) and has at
times been given more lip service than enforcement.
"'Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
"The doctrine is based on the premise that "a governmental purpose to con-
trol or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broad and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
" An overbreadth challenge therefore involves a relaxing of prudential stand-
ing rules as well.
" See Note, Overbreadth Review and the Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV.
532, 533 (1974).
"2 Id.
"3413 U.S. 601 (1973).
" Id. Thus the court will balance the interest of the government with the dan-
ger produced by overbreadth.
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marked the demise of overbreadth review in all but a limited class
of cases. Where pure speech is involved, overbreadth challenges
will remain viable, but as conduct becomes increasingly non-oral,
the Court has greater difficulty finding that the conduct requires
first amendment protection. Therefore, more substantial over-
breadth will be required where the petitioner's activity involves
"speech-plus-conduct."' The Court characterized the deterrent
effect of overbroad laws as "at best a prediction,"'3" implying that
the most minimal state interest is likely to justify the regulation.
Another problem in form arises where laws limiting freedom of
expression are unduly vague."' In the first amendment area, vague-
ness in a statute proscribing certain conduct is as fatal as an out-
right prohibition of the conduct involved."' Vagueness is partic-
ularly suspect where the expression is sought to be subjected to
some form of prior restraint." The danger inherent in this type of
restriction is that the communication will be suppressed, either
directly or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an
adequate determination of its first amendment status is made."'
The form of prior restraint most commonly found in airport
regulations is the requirement that those wishing to use the termi-
nals for expressive activities obtain a permit from a specific mu-
nicipal officer before any proselytizing begins. If these regulations
leave the decision whether to grant or withhold a license in the
85 See Comment, Constitutional Law: A New Test for Overbreadth, 13 WASH-
BURN L.J. 524, 529 (1974).
w 413 U.S. at 615.
37 A vagueness challenge rests ultimately on the procedural due process re-
quirement of notice; an ordinance is unconstitutional if people of common in-
telligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
or if it allows arbitrary and erratic enforcement. Papachristou v. City of Jackson-
ville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). The diffi-
culty in determining which laws fit this definition can be observed in the Court's
debate in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), centering around
the word "annoying."
" See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers v. Blount, 305 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1969). See also note 37 supra.
" Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968). See also notes
16-17 supra.
40Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel. Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); Ban-
tam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). An example of indirect dis-
couragement was found in Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), which in-
validated a Los Angeles ordinance requiring the name and address of the sponsor
to be on any handbill distributed.
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discretion of the relevant officer, they will not survive a constitu-
tional challenge."1
The Supreme Court has set up procedural safeguards necessary
for a prior restraint to survive constitutional attack.' Where a state
seeks to prohibit speech before it occurs, the burden to show the
necessity of restraints is on the government, and the licensor must
not be given the ability to grant or deny permits in a discriminatory
manner.' In addition, the administrator's decision cannot be final;
an opportunity for a judicial determination in an adversary pro-
ceeding is required before or shortly after any restraint on ex-
pression."
The second ground for invalidating ordinances limiting first
amendment freedoms is that of insufficient government interest.
Only a compelling state interest in regulating the activity can justify
such limitation.' Ordinances usually permissible under the police
41Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290 (1951); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938).
4Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
41Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Bantam Books, Inc.
v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
"The San Bemadino Mall Ordinance has been cited as a model in this area,
with the criticism that the City, not the permittee, should be required to file suit:
The Chief of Police may make his recommendation for revocation to the
Mayor and Common Council by filing a written motion of charges with the City
Clerk who shall set a hearing before the Mayor and Common Council no later
than the next Council meeting for which the agenda has not yet been closed.
The City Clerk shall give a ten (10) day notice of the date, place and time of
the hearing and a copy of the charges to the permittee by mailing such notice
and charges to the permittee ten (10) days prior to the hearing.
The Mayor and Common Council shall hear all evidence submitted by the
Chief of Police and the permittee. The permittee may cross-examine the wit-
nesses called by the Chief of Police. The permittee may be represented by coun-
sel. After all of the evidence has been submitted, the Mayor and Common Coun-
cil shall, within five (5) days after the hearing, either revoke or refuse to revoke
the permit. The City Clerk shall, within three (3) days after the decision of the
Mayor and Common Council, notify the permittee, in writing, of the decision
by depositing the notice in a United States mail box, postage prepaid, addressed
to the permittee.
If the Mayor and Common Council revoke the permit, such revocation shall
not be effective until ten (10) days after the mailing of such decision to the per-
mittee during which period the permittee may file an action in a court of com-
petent jurisdiction contesting the decision. The revocation shall not become ef-
fective after such filing until such court renders a judicial determination upholding
the validity of the decision.
Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' John Carr Affidavit, Exhibit C, International
Soc'y for Krishna Cons., Inc. v. Rochford, 425 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
'NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See also note 46 infra.
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power become invalid when applied to religious canvassing."0 To
be constitutional, an ordinance must be an impartial one designed
to safeguard the competing rights of others."' The government in-
terest must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and
the regulation must contain no more restrictions than those essen-
tial to furthering that interest.'0
The laws which most often survive a constitutional challenge are
those which restrict only the time, place, or manner of first amend-
ment conduct." Within the time, place, and manner framework are
two potential modifiers of first amendment freedoms. One is the
concept of the public forum: a given location, or part of the loca-
tion, may be deemed suitable or unsuitable for freedom of expres-
sion. The second is the evolving body of law protecting the indi-
vidual's right to privacy, including the problem of the captive
audience. The right to free expression does not necessarily include
the right to force speech on an unwilling audience.
The concept of the public forum finds its basis in the idea that
freedom of speech secures to speakers some right to use public
places for expression. Traditionally, streets and parks have been
the poor man's printing press,"° and the courts have generally
" See Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942). Compare Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). This is also true in a number of other situa-
tions. Anti-litter regulations have been universally condemned when applied to
persons distributing handbills. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
The motive of traffic control has only been upheld when crucial to public safety
rather than desirable to avoid congestion. See International Soc'y for Krishna
Cons., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 347 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. La. 1972). Neither
is protection of the public from fraud or crime a sufficient government interest
where the power of censorship is involved. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268 (1951). Nor may speech be prohibited merely because it might be offensive
to some of the hearers. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
"International Soc'y for Krishna Cons., Inc. v. Conlisk, 374 F. Supp. 1010
(N.D. Il. 1973). See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1935).
48 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). This requirement stems
from the principles underlying the overbreadth decisions. See text accompanying
notes 29-36 supra.
4This exception originated in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941),
in which the Court upheld an ordinance requiring parade permits.
"Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). See also Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum:
Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 11-12: "[In an open democratic society
the streets, the parks, and other public places are an important facility for public
discussion and political process. They are in brief a public forum that the citizen
can commandeer."
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recognized the importance of first amendment rights in these loca-
tions: "[s]uch use of the streets and public places has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties
of citizens." 1
A finding that an area is public, however, does not guarantee its
availability as a forum;"2 it also has to meet a test of appropriate-
ness. Forum status therefore depends on a number of considera-
tions: type of area," size, location, customary use, and the com-
munity needs which the place serves. The character of the loca-
tion, the pattern of usual activity, and the type of people who use
the area are all influential in determining whether a given location
is an appropriate site for communication of views." Where the
problem is conflict between free speech and the primary use of the
area, the court must assess the extent to which that use will be dis-
rupted if access for free expression is permitted."
The problem becomes more acute when access to non-traditional
forums such as airports is demanded. It has been held that a library
is a public forum 6 and that the courtyard of a jail is not." In Food
Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.," it was held
that a shopping center was the functional equivalent of a business
district and therefore a proper forum for first amendment activities.
The Court held that free speech may not be abridged in appropri-
ate places on the ground that alternate forums are available.'
Four years later, however, Logan Valley was "distinguished"; the
majority decided that speech must be related to the forum's opera-
tion and that the existence of alternate forums is relevant.' Then,
51 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. at 515-16.
' Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
" Areas considered have included parks, terminals, shopping centers, and
streets.
'
4 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282-83 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring); Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1972); Wolin v.
Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940
(1968).
5 Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d at 89.
" Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
5 Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
8391 U.S. 308 (1968).
59 Id.
' Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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in Hudgens v. NLRB" the Court announced that it had in effect
overruled Logan Valley and said that first amendment rights had
"no part to play" in a private shopping center." Thus, the Supreme
Court appears to be moving in the direction of restricting access
to nontraditional forums, particularly those which are privately-
owned.
The status of terminals serving various modes of travel has not
been considered by the Supreme Court, but various state and
federal courts have dealt with the issue. The general consensus
seems to be that terminals are appropriate forums, but that regula-
tions may be placed on "expressive" uses of the terminal. Public
forum status has been extended to a railroad station 3 and to a
municipal bus terminal." In carefully considering the problem in
Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, the Second Circuit found
that a bus terminal is not unlike a small city.' Further, the primary
activity for which a terminal is designed is attended with crowds,
unrest, and less than perfect order; there would be little unusual
in the disturbance created by those using the area as a forum. The
court found the requisite relationship between speech and forum
in that the terminal was the place where the desired audience
could be found. The decision did allow for possible restrictions,
however: "the Port Authority may set approximate and reasonable
limitations on the number of persons who may engage in such
activities at any specific time, ...and the specific places in the
building where the rights of expression may be exercised." '
A few courts have directly considered whether the municipal
airport can be a forum, and all have held that it is to be treated
as public for first amendment purposes.' This is true even if the
61424 U.S. 507 (1976).
62 Id.
'
3 In re Hoffman, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d 353 (1967).
64 Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 940 (1968).
Id. at 89.
Id. at 94.
67 Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F.2d
1130 (9th Cir. 1973); International Soc'y for Krishna Cons., Inc. v. Engelhardt,
425 F. Supp. 176, 180 (W.D. Mo. 1977). Airports, however, have been held to be
private property for other purposes. See Continental Bus Systems, Inc. v. City
of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (private for purposes of com-
merce clause).
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airport is miles from town and relatively free from public attrac-
tions such as restaurants and boutiques." The matter received the
most extended consideration in International Society for Krishna
Consciousness v. Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport Board." The
district court rejected analogies to libraries, prisons, shopping cen-
ters, and city streets,"0 considering instead cases concerning other
airports and company towns.' It found it unlikely that the Airport
Board could justify a complete ban on first amendment activities.
The court held that to justify any restrictions on leafletting, the
airport must prove that such activities in fact obstruct airport
traffic." The opinion noted, however, that regulations necessary for
the management of the airport would be permitted, and that some
areas may be kept free from solicitation." In short, the public
forum theory offers only limited possibilities for curbing airport
solicitation, but does not rule out regulation completely.
Another potential limitation on airport evangelists comes from
the evolving body of law concerning the individual's right to
privacy." This theory is undergirded by principles of philosophy
and public policy, although its constitutional origins are somewhat
vague." The group with the strongest claim to protection outside
68 International Soc'y for Krishna Cons., Inc. v. Engelhardt, 425 F. Supp. 176
(W.D. Mo. 1977).
69 391 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
7' Id.
71 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Chicago Area Military Project
v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975);
Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1973).
72391 F. Supp. at 612.
7 Id.
U The reasons given for protecting privacy include the theory that the indi-
vidual should be free to choose what he sees or hears and that some kinds of
communication are so intrinsically offensive to large numbers of people that
their expression constitutes an act of aggression more akin to conduct than speech.
See Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to be Spoken To?, 67 Nw.
U.L. REV. 153 (1972). Others see it as a fight for freedom of the mind. See C.
Black, He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Might of the Captive Auditor, 53 Co-
LUM. L. REV. 960 (1953). From a policy standpoint, some jurists hold that the
nature of modern society means that humans are rarely free from distractions;
hence what autonomy remains must be carefully guarded. Rowan v. Post Office
Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
72 Some writers believe that the right stems from the liberty clause of the fifth
amendment. See Recent Decisions, Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 13 DuQ.
L. REV. 1003 (1975). The first, fourth, and ninth amendments have also been
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the home from the exercise of the first amendment rights of others
is the captive audience. To be truly "captive," a person must be
so situated as to have no alternative but to remain, no choice but
to hear and see what is said and shown."6 And while most privacy
cases center on the home, the "right to be let alone" has been ex-
tended to public places for certain captive audiences.
In the "loudspeaker cases," one group's right to privacy was
recognized as a limit on another's right to a public forum." Al-
though in one case the Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance
which completely banned the use of amplification devices, 8 in
another it sustained the application of a Trenton, New Jersey,
ordinance which prohibited "loud and raucous noises" coming from
loudspeakers on vehicles. 9 This was done in the name of the un-
willing listener: "[I]n his home or on the street he is practically
helpless to escape this interference with his privacy . . .. "
Even more applicable to the airport situation are the cases deal-
ing with captive passengers. The landmark case in this area is the
much-criticized Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,81 in which the
Court found that the constitutional right of passengers to be free
from speech outweighed the petitioner's right to free speech. The
Court held, therefore, that the city politician had no right to buy
space for campaign posters on city buses and that the bus was not
a public forum. The passengers' right of privacy, even outside
the home, outweighed the first amendment rights of the politician.
B. ISKCON v. Rochford
Against this background, the district court in ISKCON v. Roch-
ford dealt at length with the issue of vagueness and did not reach
suggested as sources of privacy rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
78 Douglas wrote: "[T]he man on the streetcar has no choice but to sit and
listen, or perhaps to sit and to try not to listen." Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak,
343 U.S. at 469 (emphasis in original).
"Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558
(1948).
78 Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. at 560.
71 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. at 89.
81 d. at 87.
'1418 U.S. 298 (1974).
Because commercial advertising was allowed on the buses, this case has
been criticized as denying equal access on the basis of content. Such criticism,
however, does not deal with Lehman's privacy holding per se.
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the complexity of the public forum and privacy questions. Although
the Chicago ordinance was much more specific than its predeces-
sors, the court held it to be unconstitutionally vague." Such phrases
as "persons authorized by law to distribute literature," "commercial
purposes," and "noise ... [or] other disturbance"" were found to
be dangerously unclear. The court also objected to the ordinance's
failure to specify to which areas of the Chicago airports the regula-
tions referred.'
The court's treatment of the public forum and privacy issues
was summary. The former was dismissed in a single sentence:
"Without question, the First and Fourteenth Amendments apply
to government-owned airports like Meigs, Midway and O'Hare.""
The latter was included by inference in the court's discussion of
first amendment rights. It stated that cities may protect their citi-
zens from "undue annoyance" without mentioning the foundation
of that right.8"
The interests of the captive audience were not analyzed by the
Rochford court. Purportedly to protect the captive audience and
transportation function of the airport, persons distributing litera-
ture were banned by the Chicago ordinance from departure lounges
and the concourses leading to them, from security areas, ticket
counters, baggage pickup areas, washrooms, areas leased to con-
cessionaires, elevators, escalators, doors, vestibules, and lines."
The court may have feared that this did not leave any real forum.
More restricted prohibitions in the interests of "captives" might
survive, however. Dicta in some airport cases indicate that prose-
lytizing may be prohibited in narrow corridors leading to departure
gates and at check-in counters and their lines.8' Washrooms, be-
cause of similar factors of congestion and compulsion, may fall
into the same category. In another case, a district court found the
rights of airport lessees important enough to require their joinder
83 425 F. Supp. at 740-43.
14 Airport Regulations, III. See note 3 supra.
85 425 F. Supp. at 740.
88 Id.
87 Id. at 739.
88 Airport Regulations, I. See note 3 supra.
"9 Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d at 926; Inter-
natonal Soc'y for Krishna Cons. v. Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport Bd., 391
F. Supp. at 612.
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as indispensable parties." Some regulation may therefore be per-
missible in the interests of airlines and concessionaires.
The issue becomes at what point persons are so confined and the
expression so objectionable that the state has a compelling interest
in protecting their privacy. The situation in which the target of
communication is physically captive91 should be distinguished from
times when the target could "turn off" the message by walking
away, averting his eyes, or exercising some sort of selective percep-
tion. When the target (in the airport, the traveler) is unable in
any way to escape the communication, he should be protected by
law. Suppression of the communication itself, however, will be
allowed only as a last resort when less restrictive alternatives have
failed."
The public forum issue was summarily disposed of by the court
in Rochford. The finding of a public forum, however, does not fore-
close an inquiry into appropriateness. Narrow regulations of time,
place, and manner which serve the purpose of preserving safety
and the airport's utility as a part of public transportation will be
permissible.' The Seventh Circuit has held that specified areas of
a park, a traditional public forum, can be exclusively designated
for non-speech activities as long as alternate areas in the same park
with the same potential for communication are opened.' This prin-
ciple would also support an ordinance which prohibited evangelism
in certain areas so long as sufficient public areas remain open to
Krishna-type activities. A privately-owned airport might even claim
to be immune to first amendment claims, given the Supreme Court's
decision in Hudgens v. NLRB,' the most recent shopping center
case.
The outcome of ISKCON v. Rochford points the way to an ac-
ceptable balance between the rights of travelers and solicitors.
When combined with the concepts of privacy and the public forum,
90 International Soc'y for Krishna Cons., Inc. v. New York Port Auth., 425
F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
91 A person may be considered "captive" when he cannot leave the place or
is being pursued.
92 Van Nuys Publishing Co. v. City of Thousand Oaks, 5 Cal. 3d 819, 489
P.2d 809, 97 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1042 (1972).
"MHynes v. Mayor & Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
'
4 Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746, 760-61 (7th Cir. 1972).
424 U.S. 507 (1976). See text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
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a workable statute might emerge which would look something
like this:
I. PREAMBLE
In order to balance the right of the traveling public and those
who have a right to be in public places to publicize their views, the
following regulations are adopted, to be effective immediately.
These regulations are intended to-
(a) assure fair use of airport facilities by all groups;
(b) protect the primary function of the airport, that is, its serv-
ice to travelers; and
(c) discourage harassment of persons so situated that they have
no choice but to listen to all comers and are in fact a captive audi-
ence.
II. DEFINITIONS
Whenever they appear in these regulations, the following words
shall be defined as they are defined in this section-
(a) check-in counters-ticket sales counters, flight and baggage
check-in counters, and ticket validation/seat selection counters in
the airport.
(b) emergency conditions-those conditions when the presence
of dangerously large crowds presents a significant hazard to the
safety of all people in the airport. This shall include--
(1) hazardous weather conditions such that the resulting flight
delays have caused the total number of people in the airport termi-
nal to exceed the maximum number permitted by fire and safety
regulations;
(2) other conditions which cause the total number of people in
the airport terminal to exceed the maximum number permitted by
fire and safety regulations; and
(3) situations where threats of violence to the airport or the
people in the airport make it imperative that all public announce-
ments made within airport terminals be heard.
(c) public areas of the airport-all areas of the airport except
stores, offices, restaurants, and food counters.
(d) persons wishing to use airport facilities to publicize their
views-all persons wishing to distribute or sell literature, solicit
contributions, or communicate their ideas.
(e) captive audience-person(s) so situated that they have no
choice but to see and hear what is shown and said, who cannot




(a) Each person who wishes to use airport facilities to publicize
his views must register with the airport manager immediately upon
arrival. The word "register" shall describe the following process:
each person wishing to use airport facilities to publicize his views
must, immediately upon arrival at the airport each day, go to the
office of the airport manager. The person must give his name to
the airport manager and indicate the approximate area in which
he will be located that day. The airport manager will give each
person permission to carry on his activities.
(b) Should the airport manager wish to revoke the permission
to use airport facilities given in accordance with section (a) above,
the following procedures must be adopted: The airport manager
may make his recommendation for revocation to the mayor and
common council by filing a written motion of charges with the city
clerk who shall set a hearing before the mayor and common council
no later than the next council meeting for which the agenda has
not yet been closed. The city clerk shall give a ten (10) day notice
of the date, place, and time of the hearing and a copy of the
charges to the permittee by mailing such notice and charges to the
permittee ten (10) days prior to the hearing.
The mayor and common council shall hear all evidence sub-
mitted by the airport manager and the permittee. The permittee
may cross-examine the witnesses called by the airport manager.
The permittee may be represented by counsel. After all of the
evidence has been submitted, the mayor and common council
shall, within five (5) days after the hearing, either revoke or re-
fuse to revoke the permit. The city clerk shall, within three (3)
days after the decision of the mayor and common council, notify
the permittee, in writing, of the decision by depositing the notice
in a United States mail box, postage prepaid, addressed to the
permittee.
If the mayor and common council revoke the permit, such re-
vocation shall not be effective until ten (10) days after the mailing
of such decision to the permittee during which period the permittee
may notify the city clerk that he wishes to contest the decision.
In this case the city must file an action in a court of competent
jurisdiction in order to enforce the revocation. The revocation shall
not become effective after such filing until such court renders a
judicial determination upholding the validity of the decision.
(c) In section (b) above "permittee" shall indicate the person
wishing to use airport facilities to publicize his views. "Permit"
shall refer to the permission given by the airport manager to so
use the airport.
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IV. USE OF THE AIRPORT
All persons wishing to use airport facilities to publicize their
views may do so in the public areas of the airport with the follow-
ing exceptions-
(a) In order to protect the constitutional privacy rights of the
captive audience, persons wishing to use airport facilities to publi-





(4) anti-hijack security equipment; and
(5) persons waiting in line at the above-listed areas.
(b) In order to protect the safety and security of all persons
in the airport, it shall be unlawful for any person, alone or in con-
cert with others, to engage in publicizing his views in the airport
in such a manner as to unreasonably interfere with free ingress or
egress to and from any airport facility, or to unreasonably inter-
fere with the transaction of airport business, or to obstruct or un-
reasonably interfere with free use of public streets, sidewalks, or
other public ways adjacent or contiguous thereto.
(c) In order to protect the safety and security of all persons in
the airport, all persons using airport facilities to publicize their
views may be asked to temporarily cease carrying on such activities
should emergency conditions exist. Permission to resume such
activities shall be automatically granted as soon as the emergency
conditions no longer exist.
V. NARROW CONSTRUCTION
These regulations shall be narrowly construed so as to protect
the first amendment rights of those wishing to publicize their views
at the airport and shall be applied only to insure the safe and
efficient functioning of the airport and the rights of travelers.
There are, of course, no guarantees that these regulations will
survive judicial scrutiny, particularly on vagueness grounds. How-
ever, they seem to have a better chance of survival than their prede-
cessors.
The preamble is much like that in the Chicago ordinance. It
omits or amends language which was objected to by the Rochford
court and tries to tie the interest asserted by the airport more di-
rectly to the ideas of the public forum and captive audience. A
benign purpose, however, cannot save the regulations if they are
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otherwise objectionable."' The definition section is intended to cure
some of the vagueness problems inherent in earlier regulations by
clarifying some words and phrases which were thought to be am-
biguous.
The use of a preregistration procedure may present problems.
The Supreme Court has invalidated a law solely because it re-
quired all handbills distributed to contain the name and address
of the sponsor. ' The provision here, however, will probably survive
for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court is no longer as willing
to find "chilling effects" on first amendment freedoms as it once
was."' Second, the airport manager is required to grant permission
for the applicant to carry on his activities. Before such permission
can be revoked there must be both administrative and judicial
procedures assuring a fair hearing to all parties.'
The limitation of forum status to public areas also seems justifi-
able. Those locations which are privately-owned should fall under
the protection given private property such as shopping centers.'
Also, the interests of lessees may be deserving of protection."' In
ISKCON v. Rochford, the plaintiffs did not seek access "to private
areas such as stores, offices, and counter-space.
' °
0
The proposed regulations limit the "captive audience" areas to
places where the person accosted has no choice but to remain.
Passengers are required to go through the various phases of check-
in, and should someone be approached at such a time he could not
escape. Privacy interests should therefore come into play and allow
this limited restriction on proselytizing. It should be noted that the
areas thus excluded are intended to be small ones with ample space
remaining for speakers to use. The five foot limitation is not
meant to be a "mathematical straightjacket,"'" but a guideline to
"See, e.g., Interstate Circuit v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 688-89 (1968).
97Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
O'See text accompanying notes 29-36 supra.
"The procedure used is closely adapted from the San Bernadino Mail Ordi-
nance. See note 44 supra and text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
'o"See text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
1o1 International Soc'y for Krishna Cons., Inc. v. New York Port Auth., 425
F. Supp. 681, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
192 Plaintiff's Reply to Summary Judgment Opposition, International Soc'y for
Krishna Cons., Inc. v. Rochford at 15, 425 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
'"Medrano v. Allee, 347 F. Supp. 605, 624 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 416 U.S. 802 (1973).
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provide appropriate standards for enforcement which are not un-
duly vague. It is not intended that airport police make their rounds
with a tape measure, but that the captive audience be adequately
protected.
Protection of public safety has been recognized as a sufficiently
compelling government objective to justify certain narrow regula-
tions.10' The provision included here, protecting entrances and exits
and the flow of traffic, is modeled after a Mississippi law which was
upheld by the Supreme Court in 1968.201 Likewise the provision
for emergency conditions, properly limited, seems reasonable. Simi-
lar restrictions on demonstrations have been allowed due to condi-
tions such as rush hour traffic.'
In addition to the regulations listed above, each airport might
add a tailor-made clause protecting the ability of that particular
airport to function, provided that it can show a compelling interest
in doing so. For example, an airport with particular security prob-
lems might set a maximum number of persons who may engage in
first-amendment activities at any specific time." ' Absolute limits
on numbers, however, are only permissible when they are no more
restrictive than is essential to promote the government interest in-
volved and when that interest is a permissible one such as safety,
security, or physical space. There must also be provisions for
waiver of such limits when applicants can show that their activities
would be carried out in such a way as to render unlikely any sub-
stantial risk to the public. 08
It has been suggested that what is required is, in effect, a set of
Robert's Rules of Order for the public forum, "albeit the designing
of such rules poses a problem of formidable practical difficulty. 1...
Proposed guidelines include a premise that no person should be
insulated from the initial impact of any kind of communication,
but that the law should protect his right to escape a continued
bombardment by that communication if he wishes to be free from
104 See notes 20, 46 supra.
103 MIsS. CODE ANN. § 2318.5 (Supp. 1966) (current version at Miss. CODE
ANN. § 97-7-61 (1972)), upheld in Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
100 Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
1 0 Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d at 94.
100 See Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d at 731-32.
19o Kalven, supra note 50.
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it. ° Substantial privacy interests may not be invaded in an essen-
tially intolerable manner. 1' So long as the unwilling listener can
avoid the communication by reasonable effort, he may not demand
that the speaker and his willing listeners avoid him. Once an indi-
vidual rejects a message, however, the government may protect him
from further exposure by insisting that some avenue of escape be
held open.
The limits of the ordinance suggested will doubtless prove un-
satisfactory to those who find contact with airport proselytizers dis-
tasteful. The importance of the right of free expression, however,
dictates that any balancing of the interests of travelers and Krishnas
be done with the balancer's thumb on the side of freedom of ex-
pression. The first amendment "presupposes that right conclusions
are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and
will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all. ' 11.
Elizabeth G. Thornburg
"
0 Haiman, supra note 74, at 193.
11 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
112 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943),
aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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